Recent Legislation- Tort Law by unknown
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 16
1975
Recent Legislation- Tort Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Torts Commons
This Recent Legislation is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Richmond Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Recent Legislation- Tort Law, 9 U. Rich. L. Rev. 401 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss2/16
RECENT LEGISLATION
Tort Law-VImGnIA RESTRICTS CHARITABLE IMMUNITY OF HOSPITALS-VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-629.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
That a master is liable for the torts of his servant committed within the
scope of his employment is a principle often inapplicable when the master
is a charitable institution. This doctrine of charitable tort immunity'
evolved from a trio of English cases. In Foeffees of Heriot's Hospital v.
Ross,2 the House of Lords enunciated the "trust fund theory"3 insulating
the hospital from liability for a breach of trust by one of its trustees.
Immunity for charitable institutions endured in England for only 25 years.,
This doctrine was first introduced in the United States in 1876.1 Al-
though initially finding many followers, the much maligned6 doctrine is
now in full retreat.7 The most frequently leveled criticism is the general
untenability of the theories upon which the charities' exemption is based.8
1. The scope of charitable immunity extends to institutions other than hospitals. However,
the purview of this article is restricted to the doctrine as applied to hospitals because of the
nature of the statute involved. Horty, The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in
Hospital Cases, 25 OMo ST. L.J. 343, 344 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Horty].
2. 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846). The two more obscure cases are Duncan v. Findlater, 7
Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839) and Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P. 1861).
3. "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom
the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different
purpose." Foeffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510 (H.L. 1846). This is the
theory most often proffered by the majority of jurisdictions in support of charitable immunity.
Horty, supra note 1, at 344.
4. See Foreman v. Canterbury, [1871] L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (discrediting the earlier "trust
fund" cases).
5. See McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
6. Modem legal writers are in virtual unanimity in favoring liability over immunity. For
an extensive but by no means exhaustive list of legal articles attacking the immunity view
see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1450-53 (1969, Supp. 1973).
The courts have long been vocal in their criticism of the immunity view. For one of the
most eloquent among the many judicial broadsides of immunity see President and Directors
of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 133, at 996 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. Even those among the rapidly declining number which still adhere to the
immunity view are restricting its operation. Id. at 995.
8. There are three theories offered to support charitable immunity. The first is the trust
fund theory, set forth at note 3 supra. Basically, this theory "proves too much," for the
jurisdictions proffering this excuse for withholding liability will allow payment out of the trust
funds for some tort claims and damages for breach of contract. See President and Directors
of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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The first pronouncement by the highest court in Virginia9 rejected total
immunity declaring that charities are liable in tort to "strangers '"' to the
institution." The court extended immunity to the institution for injuries
inflicted through the negligence of its servants upon paying as well as non-
paying 2 beneficiaries 3 unless the servant was negligently hired or being
retained after having been proved incompetent. 4 The Virginia Supreme
Court never departed from these principles of limited charitable immun-
ity.15
The second is inapplicability of respondeat superior. This theory states that because the
institutions are not profit-seeking, respondeat superior does not apply to them. Farrigan v.
Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (1906). But vicarious liability is imposed because of the
master's right to control his servant. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N.W.2d 151 (1950). This should not be limited to profitable businesses. PROSSER, supra note
7, at 993.
The third is implied waiver or assumption of risk. This theory is based upon the fiction
that the patient or one admitting the patient to a charitable institution impliedly waives his
cause of action for negligence or assumes the risk thereof. Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St.
Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
Finally, some jurisdictions proffer a general public policy argument. "That these great
public charities should be maintained for the public good cannot be questioned, and if as a
result an individual injury is sometimes suffered, it is equally plain that it is better that the
individual should suffer than that the public charity should not be carried on." Id. at 602,
107 S.E. at 790. But it is unrealistic to assume that donors will discontinue their support
simply because some of their funds must necessarily be directed to settle tort claims. PROSSER,
supra note 7,, at 994.
9. Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
10. "Strangers" is a term used by the Virginia court to denote those non-trespassing per-
sons not availing themselves of the medical services of the institution, such as a person
accompanying a friend upon his being admitted to a hospital. See, e.g., Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n
v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 133 S.E.2d 559 (1963).
11. 116 Va. at 116, 81 S.E. at 18. Further, in this case the groundwork was laid for the
determination of whether an institution is to be considered "charitable" or not for purposes
of exempting it from liability. Id. at 104, 81 S.E. at 14. This issue, also expounded upon in
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959), is beyond the scope of
this comment.
12. In pointing out that a paying patient is nevertheless a "charity patient," the Virginia
court said in Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921):
It is true that he is paying for the privilege he enjoys, and this may entitle him to
greater luxuries which his money can supply, but not to any greater care or freedom
from negligence on the part of the attendants. The rich and the indigent stand on the
same footing as to protection against such negligence. Id. at 597, 107 S.E. at 788.
13. "Beneficiaries" is a term of art simply encompassing those persons receiving medical
treatment within the institution, whether or not they pay for the services they receive.
14. For an early application of this principle to allow recovery to a beneficiary, see Norfolk
Protestant Hosp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S.E. 363 (1934).
15. See Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 133 S.E.2d 559 (1963); Hill v. Leigh
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 204 Va. 501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963); Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes,
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In 1959 Justice Snead, fielding Virginia's first challenge to this doctrine,
questioned its continuing validity,1" but declined to judicially abrogate the
rule. 7 At this time, fears of retroactive application of liability"8 "without
[having] afford[ed] any opportunity to those affected to indemnify
themselves against loss," and a fear of appearing to legislate from the
bench,1 kept Virginia from effecting a transition from immunity to liabil-
ity.20
After several early attempts to restrict charitable immunity,2' the Vir-
ginia General Assembly in 1974 enacted Section 8-629.2.2 The statute
200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959); Norfolk Protestant Hasp. v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173
S.E. 363 (1934); Weston's Adm'r v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).
16. Memorial Hasp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 889, 108 S.E.2d 388, 396 (1959).
17. Id.
18. Id. This fear may have been unfounded, since charitable hospitals were already liable
to "strangers" to the institution they probably had already procured some insurance. More-
over, two courses of action were then open to the court to insure that Virginia would soon be
rid of charitable immunity, while guarding against having ruinous judgments inflicted upon
uninsured charitable institutions. First it could have, as did the court in Colby v. Carney
Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969), upheld the rule in the instant case but stated
that the next time the immunity issue was squarely before the court, it intended to abolish
it. This would have given fair warning to charities to insure themselves.
Second, it could have abrogated the rule but given its ruling prospective effect only. The
Virginia Supreme Court has given tacit approval to this method. See Fountain v. Fountain,
214 Va. 347, 200 S.E.2d 513 (1973), declaring that its abrogation of interspousal tort immunity
in Surrat, Adm'r v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971), was to have prospective
effect only. For a general discussion of this judicial tool, see 25 MAINE L. REv. 359 (1973).
19. 200 Va. at 889, 108 S.E.2d at 396.
20. Judicial abrogation would have prevented some of the problems possibly arising from
ambiguities in the statute discussed below.
21. H.B. No. 145 (1962) (making charitable institutions liable to paying patients); H.B.
No. 721 (1966); S.J.R. 34 (1970) (establishing joint commission to study and report on "advis-
ability of abolishing or limiting" charitable immunity); H.B. No. 1077 (1972); S.J.R. 54 (1972)
(directing the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council to study charitable and soverign immun-
ity).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-629.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974) reads:
Tort liability of Hospitals. - Hospital as referred to in this section shall include any
institution within the definition of hospital in § 32-298 of the Code of Virginia and
maternity hospital as defined in § 32-147 of the Code of Virginia.
No hospital, as defined in this section, shall be immune from liability for negligence
or any other tort on the ground that it is a charitable institution unless such hospital
renders exclusively charitable medical services for which service no charge is ever made
to or on account of the patient or unless the party alleging such negligence or other
tort was accepted as a patient by such institution under an express written agreement
executed by the hospital and delivered at the time of admission to the patient or the
person admitting such patient providing that all medical services furnished such pa-
tient are to be supplied on a charitable basis without financial liability to the patient
or reimbursement to the hospital for the specific services rendered such patient from
1975]
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contains four components. First, it defines hospital by reference to the
hospital licensing law, which encompasses any place where facilities are
maintained for the medical or nursing attention of any two nonrelated
physically or mentally ill persons,"3 and includes any maternity hospital. '
Second, it provides that no charitable hospital shall have a claim of
immunity unless it renders exclusively charitable services for which no
charge is ever made to or on account of the patient.5 Two problems are
inherent in this clause. One is the ambiguous phrase "the patient." Con-
strued to mean the injured patient who is suing the institution, the charity
could still enjoy immunity if it had not made any charge to or on account
of that particular patient, even if it had not previously informed him of
the fact that he was not being charged." This construction, however, when
read in light of the next clause, renders the statute somewhat absurd,
and, since statutes are to be construed to avoid absurdity2 the clause must
be given its only other reasonable construction, "any patient."
Construed to mean "any patient," the clause becomes ineffective as a
device for allowing charitable institutions in Virginia to retain their im-
munity. Virtually no institution in the state renders services for which it
never charges any patient.2 9
The third component provides that the charitable institution will retain
immunity if it delivers to the patient, upon admission, a written agreement
that he will not be charged for services. This is designed to eliminate a
harsh result from application of the common law rule. Under the statute,
persons having the means to and intending to pay will not be left without
a cause of action when, unaware that they are receiving gratuitous treat-
any other source; provided, however, that a hospital which is a charitable institution
and which is insured against liability for negligence or other tort in an amount not less
than $100,000 for each occurrence shall not be liable for damage in excess of the limits
of such insurance.
23. Id. § 32-298(2) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
24. Id. § 32-147(3).
25. Id. § 8-629.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
26. Therefore a person entering an institution fully intending to and having the means to
pay may find himself remediless when injured by a servant of the institution, which situation
was one of the greatest evils under the Virginia common law rule of immunity.
27. If "the patient" is construed to mean "the patient suing the hospital," and read in
conjunction with the clause immediately following, it would render charitable hospitals im-
mune if they informed the patient that he was not being charged, or if they did not, so long
as he was not being charged.
28. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 267, 53 S.E. 401, 409 (1906).
29. Of the hospitals that could have hoped to enjoy this exemption, nearly all render at
least occasional services to Medicare patients, on whose account a charge is made. Telephone




ment, they are injured by the negligence of an employee. Moreover, this
clause allows a charitable hospital which cannot qualify under the exclu-
sively charitable criterion" to maintain its charitable immunity in the case
where a non-paying beneficiary is injured.
The fourth component is ostensibly the limiting clause. It states that a
charitable hospital carrying insurance against liability in excess of
$100,000 for each occurrence "shall not be liable for damage in excess of
the limits of [its] insurance."3' Two problems arise. A literal interpreta-
tion of this clause would limited the amount recoverable by a "stranger"
injured by any servant of the institution, and would also limit the amount
recoverable by a "beneficiary" injured by a servant negligently employed
or negligently retained. These classes of persons were afforded unlimited
recovery for injury under the Virginia common law rule. But, since the
statute was purportedly designed to restrict rather than to expand charita-
ble immunity,2 the courts may well hold the common law rule controlling.
Further, it may be that this clause is of little significance to many charita-
ble institutions, because the limits of their insurance are above that which
the average injured person would be seeking as damages. 3
The probable present state of charitable immunity in Virginia would
allow:
1) Strangers to have unlimited recovery against any charitable hospital
for injury caused by the negligence of any of its servants.
2) Beneficiaries to have:
a) Unlimited recovery against any charitable hospital for injury
caused by its servants who were negligently hired or negligently retained.
b) Limited recovery3 against any "non-exclusively charitable" hospi-
tal which admits him without notice that he is not being charged, for injury
caused by a non-negligently hired and retained servant.
c) No recovery for injuries against any exclusively charitable hospital.
d) No recovery for injuries against any charitable hospital which ad-
mits him with notice that he is not being charged.
30. It may be that no hospital can qualify as "exclusively charitable." See note 29 and
accompanying text supra.
31. VA. CODE. ANN. § 8-629.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
32. Comm. Substitute for H.B. No. 188 (1974) is prefaced: "A BILL . .. to partially
abolish the common law doctrine of charitable immunity."
33. Most major hospitals in Virginia are insured for up to $50,000 for each occurrence of
negligently-inflicted injury, with aggregate coverage of $1,000,000. Telephone conversation
with Stuart D. Ogren, Executive Director of the Virginia Hospital Association, November 11,
1974 [hereinafter cited as Ogren].
34. Recovery in this instance will be limited to the amount of the hospital's liability
insurance if the hospital carries insurance covering over $100,000 in damages for each occurr-
ence. See statute cited note 22 supra.
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Thus construed, the only new cause of action created by the statute is 2(b),
that of beneficiaries without notice in a "non-exclusively charitable" hos-
pital injured by a competent employee.
In addition to problems of construction, the statute's partial repeal of
charitable immunity may well result in imposing an economic hardship on
many hospitals. It is estimated that, as a result of this statute, all basic
per bed hospital insurance rates will increase 772%.1
Tort Law-VIRGINIA DIscARDs DoLLAR LIMITATION ON WRONGFUL DEATH
RECOVERY-VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
The placing of a dollar value limit on the life of a human being in a
wrongful death action is arguably arbitrary, since this is generally consid-
ered to be within the province of the jury upon due consideration of the
facts in each particular case. The Virginia General Assembly has seen fit
to reverse its stand on this issue by abolishing the limitation on recovery
imposed on beneficiaries of decedents whose death was caused by the
wrongful act of another.
The first wrongful death act appeared in England in 18461 in response
to the common law rule refusing the right to recovery. 2 Subsequently
virtually every American jurisdiction 3 adopted either a "survival statute",
or a "death act ' 5 to allow for such recovery.
The death acts normally provide for recovery measured by loss to the
beneficiaries6 under one or more of the following categories: (1) pecuniary
loss, (2) loss of services, (3) loss of consortium, (4) mental anguish, (5)
35. Ogren, supra note 33. In addition many major hospital liability insurance companies
are already abandoning the Virginia market. Id.
1. Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
2. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808) (in civil court the death of a human
being is not an "injury").
3. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 24.1 (1956, Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES].
4. This type of statute preserves the cause of action of the deceased beyond his death. W.
PaOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
5. These statutes, modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, create a new cause of action in the
deceased's personal representative for the benefit of certain designated persons. Id.
6. Thirty-nine states, including Virginia, use this "loss to beneficiaries" measure of dam-




medical expenses, and (6) funeral expenses. 7 Fearing that sympathetic
juries would return excessive verdicts,8 many states responded by placing
a dollar limitation on recovery.'
The first wrongful death act enacted in Virginia provided that the jury
shall award damages which they feel are fair and just, "not exceeding ten
thousand dollars."'10 It was modeled after Lord Campbell's Act and was
interpreted as not restricting recovery to strictly pecuniary loss." This
statute remained in its basic form, except for changes in classification of
beneficiaries and increases in the amount of recovery allowable, until
1968.1,
It would seem that the 1968 Virginia General Assembly would have
followed the lead of its legislative predecessors'3 and continued to liberalize
recovery under Virginia's wrongful death act. Perhaps they so intended, 4
but in increasing the total amount recoverable to $75,000 they encumbered
two-thirds of it by requiring proof of dependency, 5 later construed to mean
actual dependency.'" Therefore, if the deceased had no dependents, the
maximum recovery allowed his beneficiaries would be $25,000. Faced with
this impediment to liberalization of the Virginia death act, the next session
of the General Assembly began a series of unsuccessful attempts to amend
it.'" It was not until 1974 that the General Assembly was successful.
7. See S. SPEisR, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 3:3 et seq. (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SPESER].
8. Id. § 7:4.
9. In 1968, 13 states had dollar limitations ranging from $10,000 to $100,000. HARPER &
JAhmS, supra note 3, at § 25.13 n.2.
10. Va. Acts of Assembly 1870-71, ch. 29, at 27.
11. See Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 570 (1877). Later pronouncements
by the court portrayed further their intent to give liberal construction to the words "fair and
just." See, e.g., Ratcliffe v. McDonald's Adm'r, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918) (pecuniary
loss, solace and loss of society).
12. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1920, ch. 26, at 27; Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, ch. 228, at
337 ($15,000 maximum); Va. Acts of Assembly 1952, ch. 60, at 83 ($25,000 maximum); Va.
Acts of Assembly 1958, ch. 387, at 510 ($30,000 maximum); Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch.
430, at 702 ($35,000 maximum); Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 583, at 787 ($40,000 or $50,000
maximum - language contradictory).
13. See materials cited note 12 supra.
14. Cf. Craig, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 213, 222 (1971).
15. Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 485, at 698. Under this amendment, beneficiaries could
recover up to $25,000 for "solace" and $50,000 for pecuniary loss only after proof of depend-
ency.
16. This actual dependency need not have been total. Pugh v. Yearout, 212 Va. 591, 186
S.E.2d 58 (1972).
17. Four bills were offered at the 1970 session: H.B. No. 396, "fair and just" recovery not
to exceed $75,000 with no dependency requirement; H.B. No. 344, "fair and just" recovery
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The act 8 retains the "fair and just" language which will allow the dece-
dent's beneficiaries to have the benefit of a plethora of favorable decisional
law developed throughout the history of Virginia's act.'9 Moreover, it pro-
vides no maximum amount which the beneficiaries may recover. This non-
provision will clearly foreclose the possibility of inadequate compensation
for pecuniary loss to beneficiaries of wealthy decedents, and may even
affect a lightening of the court's case load.2' The amendment contains a
non-exclusive listing of elements which the jury may take into considera-
tion in determining the amount to which the beneficiaries are entitled.
With one exception,2' this listing includes virtually all elements which have
ever been deemed pertinent to recovery for wrongful death in other states.2
The last provision in the amendment provides for pro rata distribution
among creditors of moneys recovered by the beneficiaries for medical and
with no maximum; Conf. Substitute for H.B. No. 344, "fair and just" recovery with enumera-
tion of elements to be considered in determining amount and no maximum; H.B. No. 982,
"fair and just" recovery limited to $25,000 solace, and $75,000 pecuniary loss only upon proof
of dependency.
Two bills were offered at the 1972 session: S.B. No. 173, "fair and just" recovery limited
to $25,000 solace, and $100,000 pecuniary loss only upon proof of dependency; H.B. No. 384,
"fair and just" recovery with $100,000 maximum.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974) reads:
Amount and distribution of damages. - The jury in any such action may award
such damages as to it may seem fair and just, and may direct in what proportion they
shall be distributed to the surviving spouse, children, and grandchildren of the de-
ceased, or if there shall be none such, then to the parents, brothers and sisters of the
deceased. As to members of the same class, the jury shall have discretion as to who
shall receive the whole or any part of the recovery.
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for the
following: (a) sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, compan-
ionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advise of the decedent; (b) compensa-
tion for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent, and (ii) services,
protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent; (c) expenses for the care,
treatment and hospitalization of the decedent incident to the injury resulting in death;
and (d) reasonable funeral expenses.
Damages recoverable under (c) and (d) above shall be apportioned pro rata among
the creditors who rendered such services, as their respective interests may appear.
The court shall apportion the costs of the action as it shall deem proper.
19. Cases cited note 11 supra.
20. If defendants know that the beneficiaries are constrained by a maximum amount of
recovery, they are less prone to settle out of court. Chapman, Should Compensation in
Wrongful Death Actions be Limited?, 50 ILL. B.J. 782 (1962).
21. A few states adhering to the "loss to beneficiaries" criterion have allowed recovery for
the mental and physical pain and suffering experienced by the decedent between the inflic-
tion of the injury and death. But consideration of the decedent's mental anguish is clearly
incongruous with the purpose of loss to the beneficiaries statutes in general, and should be
excluded from consideration by the jury under Virginia's death act.
22. See generally SPEISER, supra note 7, at §§ 3:3 et seq.
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burial expenses. This will eliminate the possibility, present under the 1968
amendment,2 that one creditor will be reimbursed completely while an-
other will not if the jury sees fit not to award the full amount of those
expenses.
The recovery now allowed under Virginia's death act is extremely liberal.
Critics of such a liberal approach fear that the lifting of the dollar limita-
tion on recovery and the exhaustive listing of elements to be considered in
determining recovery will foster excessive jury verdicts. But this fear may
not be well-founded.24 Nevertheless, it is the province of the bench and the
reviewing court to ferret out excessiveness,n and recovery should not be
limited simply because the courts may be less adept at perceiving exces-
siveness in death actions than they are in personal injury actions, upon
which no recovery limits are placed.
Tort Law-VIRGINA ABROGATES AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE-VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-646.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
As long as there have been motor vehicles, there have been accidents
involving injuries to passengers. Case law in the vast majority of states did
not distinguish between paying and non-paying passengers for purposes of
allowing recovery for personal injury occurring as a result of their host's
ordinary negligence.' However, either as a result of adverse public senti-
ment against hitch-hiking, 2 or of persistent and effective lobbying by auto-
23. See Craig, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Death, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 213, 223
(1971).
24. It is not at all clear that imposing a ceiling on recovery in death actions results in non-
excessive verdicts, for the fixed amount may become somewhat of a "standard" rather than
a maximum. See SPEISER, supra note 7, at § 3:46.
25. Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 427
(1966).
26. See HARPER & JAmES, supra note 3, § 25.13, at 1328; SPEISER, supra note 7, § 7:4, at
491-92; Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 402, 427
(1966); Note, Wrongful Death Damages in Virginia, 12 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 396, 412-13
(1970).
1. See, e.g., Sheean v. Foster, 80 Cal. App. 56, 251 P. 235 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1926); Jacobs
v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992 (1917). Virginia, however, did not subscribe to this majority
view. See note 8 and accompanying text infra.
2. Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 287-88 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Tipton]. Attacking this theory as having been an invalid rationale for
vthholding recovery from the average guest, Prosser has commented that, "[ijn the legisla-
tive hearings there is frequent mention of the hitch-hiker, who gets little sympathy. The
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mobile liability insurance companies, 3 many states4 passed automobile
guest statutes. These statutes lowered the standard of care' owed by an
operator to his guest. By making it more difficult for guests to recover, the
enacting legislatures hoped to curtail collusive lawsuits brought by a guest
and his host against the host's liability insurance carrier, and to promote
hospitality by insuring that persons who may have otherwise offered an-
other a gratuitous ride would not be deterred by fearing liability for a
negligently inflicted injury.'
Virginia was one of only four states7 which, at common law, declared the
duty of the automobile driver to his non-paying guest to be less than
ordinary care.8 The legislature in 1938 adopted an automobile guest stat-
ute9 which simply added its stamp of approval to a principle already judi-
cially recognized.'" The act allowed a "guest without payment" recovery
for personal injury or property damage only upon proof that it resulted
from his host's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct." Not-
writer once found a hitch-hiker case, but has mislaid it. He has been unable to find another."
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 34, at 187 n.8 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
3. See, e.g., White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, 20
VA. L. REv. 326, 332-33 (1934) [hereinafter cited as White]. One commentator acutely
observed that, " ... it is perhaps more than mere coincidence that one of the first guest
statutes was enacted in the nation's 'insurance capital,' Connecticut." Note, The Present
Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 659, 664-65 n.37 (1974).
Connecticut, in 1927, was the first state to enact a guest statute. Significantly, no state
has enacted a guest statute since 1939. Tipton, supra note 2, at 288.
4. Twenty-eight states have at one time or another had a guest act in force. Note, The
Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659 (1974).
5. The statutory standard of care may be to refrain from injuring one's guest by gross
negligence, recklessness, willful and wanton misconduct, intentional misconduct or intoxica-
tion. Some employ the foregoing in various combinations. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 16.15, at 952-53 (1956, Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
6. See, e.g., Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143, 148 (D. Del. 1961), aff'd, 318 F.2d 461 (3d
Cir. 1963); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974); 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 402 (1973).
These rationales came under attack from the outset. See White, supra note 3; 14 IOWA L. REv.
243 (1929).
7. Massachusetts, Georgia and Washington were the others. White, supra note 3, at 326.
8. Virginia "deliberately adopted" the Massachusetts rule enunciated in Massaletti v.
Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917), which found the duty of care owed a guest to be
the same as that which a gratuitous bailee owed his bailor: to refrain from "gross negligence."
Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 659-60, 174 S.E. 837, 838-39 (1934). See, e.g., Boggs v. Plybon,
157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931).
9. Va. Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 285, at 417.
10. See cases cited note 8 supra.
11. Va. Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 285, at 417.
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withstanding the General Assembly's attempts to amend 2 and repeal 3
Virginia's guest statute, it remained in force until 1974 when it was sub-
stantially amended.
The first clause of the amendment 4 eliminated proof of gross negligence
making the host liable to a guest for ordinary negligence. In order to rid
guests of the prior impediment to recovery, it was necessary for the legisla-
ture to amend rather than simply repeal Virginia's guest act because of
Virginia's common law background." The second clause retained all defen-
ses otherwise available to the host" to guard against the statute being
construed as imposing strict liability for mere negligence. In short, the
statute simply calls into play the well-established rules of negligence. 7
The legislators' effective "repeal" of the guest act appears particularly
appropriate when viewed in light of several developments, which may or
may not have been causally related. 8 First, is the widespread belief that
automobile guest statutes were fundamentally ill-conceived. Three courts
have recently held that the classification embodied in this type of statute
is violative of both state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal
protection of the laws. 0 Perhaps the most eloquent expression of contem-
porary disgust appears in Brown v. Merlo.2' Justice Tobriner, speaking for
the California Supreme Court, held the classifications created between
those denied and those permitted recovery for negligently inflicted injuries
could not be rationally justified by the purposes of the statute: collusion
12. Comm. Substitute for H.B. No. 293 (1972); S.B. No. 469 (1970); H.B. No. 261 (1970);
H.B. No. 594 (1973).
13. H.B. No. 293 (1972).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The statute reads:
Any person transported by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle as a guest
without payment for such transportation and any personal representative of any such
guest so transported shall be entitled to recover damages against such owner or opera-
tor for death or injuries to the person or property of such guest resulting from the
negligent operation of such motor vehicle. However, this statute does not limit any
defense otherwise available to the owner or operator.
15. See note 8 and accompanying text surpa.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See note 14 supra.
17. If the intent of the legislature was to allow a non-paying passenger recovery under the
laws of negligence, then it is well written. Thus interpreted any problems brought about by
its adoption will necessarily be limited to problems inherent in the law of negligence.
18. The lack of legislative history makes it virtually impossible to pinpoint the force or
forces which triggered the passage of the amendment.
19. Cf. cases cited note 20 infra; Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961);
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 383; Tipton, supra note 2, at 307; White, supra note 3, at 355.
20. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Henry v.
Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
21. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
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prevention"2 and promotion of hospitality.? Following the Brown rationale,
the guest statutes of Kansas" and North Dakota2n have recently suffered a
similar fate, while those of Iowa 2 and Utah,2 rejecting Brown, have weath-
ered constitutional attack?2
Another development which substantiates the appropriateness of Vir-
22. Id. at 872-78, 506 P.2d at 224-28, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400-04. Because it denied recovery
to an entire class simply because some undefined portion of that class might collude, the
statute "present[ed] a classic case of an impermissibly overinclusive classification.
Id. at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
By enacting such statutes, the legislators ostensibly hoped to thwart the conjuring up, by
hosts and guests, of collusive lawsuits. They reasoned that non-paying passengers will likely
be sufficiently familiar with their host that this relationship could prove a breeding ground
for collusion. Therefore, by withholding recovery from gratuituous guests for injuries caused
by simple negligence of the operator, the cause of collusion prevention will be served.
This reasoning is basically unsound. For example, will a hitch-hiker who is offered a
gratuitous ride by a total stranger be sufficiently familiar with his host to be likely to collude
with him? Conversely, will the paying member of a car pool who rides to work with his "host"
everyday be unlikely to collude with him? Further, it is clear that if a guest-host combination
were bent upon concocting a fraudulent lawsuit in a state having an automobile guest statute
they could falsely state that the guest had paid for the ride, or that the injury-causing
misconduct was of the type for which a non-paying passenger could recover.
23. Id. at 864-72, 506 P.2d at 218-24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394-400. The Brown court doubted
that it was ever rational to promote hospitality by withholding recovery from negligently
injured non-paying passengers. But, it said, whatever credence this idea might once have had
has been destroyed by the development of near universal liability insurance because "there
is simply no notion of 'ingratitude' in suing your host's insurer." Id. at 868, 506 P.2d at 221,
106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
24. Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974) (unconstitutional under state and federal
constitutions).
25. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974) (unconstitutional under state consti-
tution).
26. Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974) (withstanding challenge asserting
both state and federal unconstitutionality).
27. Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah 1974) (withstanding challenge asserting both
state and federal unconstitutionality).
28. The challenged statutes in all five cases were neither substantially dissimilar to each
other nor to that of Virginia. Compare Va. Acts of Assembly 1938, ch. 285, at 417, as amended
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974) with CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (West, Cum.
Supp. 1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (Cum. Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. Am. § 8-122(b)
(1974); N.D. CENTURY CODE ch. 39-15-02 (1972); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-9-1 (1953).
Whether Virginia's unamended guest act could have passed constitutional muster is probably
dependent upon the degree of scrutiny the reviewing court would have engaged in. Because
the Virginia Supreme Court has displayed a reluctance to overturn statutes as violative of
equal protection unless the classification is extremely irrational, as evidenced in Miller v.
Ayres, 213 Va. 251, 264-66, 191 S.E.2d 261, 272-73 (1972), the unamended guest statute might
well have survived a constitutional challenge. This does not, however, dilute the appropriate-
ness of the action taken by the 1974 General Assembly in light of enduring criticism leveled
at automobile guest statutes generally.
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ginia's effective repeal is the difficulty that the Virginia courts have had
in interpreting the provisions of its guest act, and the probability that
enfranchising non-paying passengers will not result in any legal or eco-
nomic hardship. Under the amended statute, no longer will our courts
become entangled in time-consuming 9 problems such as who is a guest;3"
what constitutes payment;3 and what constitutes gross negligence.2 Fur-
ther, it is highly unlikely that liability insurance rates will increase appre-
ciably as a result of this action by the 1974 General Assembly.,
R.S.E.
29. While the number of suits may be increased by negligently injured non-paying passen-
gers exercising their newly-found cause of action, there may not be a concomitant increase
in the amount of time actually spent litigating these claims, since consideration of the
"knotty little problems" has been obviated.
30. See, e.g., Smith v. Tatum, 199 Va. 85, 97 S.E.2d 820 (1957) (father-in-law giving
daughter-in-law a driving lesson was a "guest" within meaning of statute).
31. See, e.g., Groome v. Birkhead, 214 Va. 429, 201 S.E.2d 789 (1974) (mother's undertak-
ing to purchase gasoline was not considered payment sufficient to elevate her to status of a
paying passenger).
32. See, e.g., Scott v. Foley, 205 Va. 382, 136 S.E.2d 849 (1964).
33. See Tipton, supra note 2, at 305; Comment, The Ohio Guest Statute, 22 Ooo ST. L.J.
629, 642-43 (1961).
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